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The Dynamics of Tension:
Normative Dimensions of Religion and Politics
E. CocHRA
Texas Tech University

CLARKE

Government seems to me a part of religion itself, a
thing sacred in its institution and end. For if it does not
directly remove the cause, it crushes the effects of evil
and it is as such (though a lower yet) an emanation of
the same divine power that is both author and object of
pure religion .... But that is only to evil doers, government itself being otherwise as capable of kindness,
goodness, and charity as a more private society. They
weakly err that think there is no other use of government than correction which is the coarsest part of it.
Daily experience tells us that the care and regulation
of many other affairs, more soft and daily necessary,
make up much of the greatest part of government and
[this] must have followed the peopling of the world had
Adam never fell and [it] will continue among men, on
earth, under the highest attainments they may arrive
at by the coming of the blessed Second Adam, the
Lord from Heaven.
William Penn, Preface to the Frame
of Government of Pennsylvania (1682)1
Penn's rather sanguine view of government assimilates it to both
religion and private life. Yet there is something to be said for it.
Government does outlaw (some) sin, and it does regulate (not always
softly) matters of food, clothing, and shelter. Government acts on the
border of private and public life; yet it forms its own border with
religion. I intend here to examine the dynamics of the transactions
across these borders. These transactions at their best reflect a creative
tension between religion and politics.
1. General Considerations
This tension is often misunderstood as strain between private and
public life. Yet, I shall argue, religion is a constant reminder of the unity
of public and private, but also of the boundary between them. Private
and public life need each other, but they are different realms. The
validity and the distinctive character of each contributes to a healthy
society. Religion affirms the public/private distinction, but also the
need to cross the boundary.
Because religion suggests that culture is not divine (at the most, it
is the direct will and creation of the divine), religion more directly than
other systems of value insinuates the tension between culture and
something higher than culture. Although religion is linked to culture
Note: I am grateful to the Earhart Foundation for a Fellowship Research Grant and to Texas Tech
University for a Faculty Development Leave, which supported the research and writing for this article.
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and frequently coopted by it, the "higher" religions and religions with
more reflective traditions more emphatically suggest tension with
culture. The inherent dynamic of religion's orientation to a transcendent source of being, independent of human control, opens the path
toward cultural conflict. As much as culture takes upon itself divine
color, it cannot hide its human roots.
Though the tension between the divine and the mundane
sometimes manifests itself as stress between private and public life,
the individual person, where the competing attractions of culture and
the sacred intersect, really is the locus of tension. 2 Machiavelli, for example, denouncing Christianity's public effects, clearly understood
that the strain was not between private religion (Christianity) and
public good (the republic), but between the different public demands of
Christianity and the republic on the individual. Machiavelli rejected
Christianity for its cultural consequences. The unique perspective of
religion reveals the person as a field of cross-cutting tensions between
the divine and culture in private and public life.
Because religion touches (sometimes unconsciously) the core ·of a
believer's character, it bears upon the moral boundaries of public and
private life. The role of politics in creating social peace and justice
depends upon personal interior peace and justice. Government and
politics can contribute to, as Penn argued, but cannot bring men and
women to virtuous living or inner tranquility, for they cannot prescribe
all virtuous actions or proscribe all vice. Moreover, political life cannot
bring final beatitude.
Although religion and public life intersect, religion fundamentally
reminds us of the limits of politics and of the nonequivalence of politics
and public life. In the American tradition, for example, the Bible has
reminded us "that public spirit will always be opposed by private interest," that law and coercion must supplement public virtue and participation, and that "the larger the political society, the greater the tension between body and spirit, private feelings and public duties. " 3 We
must remember that religion points resolutely to life beyond politics. It
reminds us that public problems and their solutions are not entirely
political. Indeed, the distinctive contribution of religion to public and
private life, to individuals and to culture, is to refer them to what is
beyond politics.
Two (or more) forces pulling in different directions define a tension. Sometimes its stress holds things together, for example, a rubber
band. But sometimes it causes things to break apart, as when a spring
snaps from being wound too tightly. To understand the
religion/ politics tension, we must define the directions in which each
pulls. We must also show how tension between them permits each to
work better.
Religion brings politics to awareness of the highest, lowest, and
most mysterious features of life, especially of the lofty and the
mysterious . Politics, better acquainted with the lowest, brings
religious passion and self-assurance to awareness of the middle ground
between the highest and the lowest; that is, it teaches religion the
necessity and the art of compromise. Moreover, some of the highest
and lowest things are already at home in politics-honor, bravery, lust
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for power, and the passions of blood and soil. Politics can make religion
alert to these, and to their danger.
Religion pulls toward the transcendent, toward principles, virtues,
ideals, and perfection. Unrestrained by tension this religious dynamic
produces fanaticism. Religious passion finds it difficult to compromise,
to acknowledge how striving after perfection founders on human
weakness. Politics, however, demands compromise, for the key fact of
politics, especially of participatory public life, lies in confrontation with
the ideas and the interests of others, with the mosaic of human frailty
and plurality.
Just as religion would avoid compromise, politics would avoid
righteousness. Politics pulls toward the vague middle ground, toward
indifference and cynicism. Left to itself, politics seeks the easy,
painless way. High principles make for difficult political choices, for it
is painful to confront higher things, to acknowledge the possibility of
something better and to accept the discipline necessary to reach it.
Religion in public life can teach politics about the higher things and
stimulate, even embarrass, politicians and citizens to discover them.
The tension produced by these conflicting natural tendencies
defines their relationship as both competitive and cooperative. 4 The
danger of misunderstanding the relationship between religion and
politics comes when we forget that it must include both cooperation
and competition. When the tension is lost, the two either fly apart or,
worse, collapse together. The latter is the world's too frequent condi.tion. As Roland Robertson observes, " ... [R]eligion is being politicized
and politics (as well as economics) is being sacralized intrasocially and
globally." 5 The Unification Church worldwide and religion in Iran currently exemplify politicized religion; sacralized politics takes form in
totalitarian ideologies. Both of these forms of lost tension obscure the
border between religion and politics. These territories should remain
distinct, but mutually interactive.

2. What Religion Teaches Politics
In a skeptical and relativistic age religion challenges easy moral
relativism and indifference. As Hadley Arkes remarks, " ... [M]oral
'relativism' has become the secular religion these days among those
with a college education. " 6 Religion contests the cynical and egoistic
political consequences of this relativism by advancing in public debate
principles claiming sacred roots.
Thus, despite the exaggerated claims and extreme lengths to
which some religious groups have gone in policy debates, it is healthy
for a political system (and for citizens) dangerously close to "interest
group liberalism" to face demands for unilateral disarmament, feeding
the hungry and taking care of the sick, full employment, action against
cocaine, marijuana, teen pregnancy, and pornography, cessation of
abortion, and an end to capital punishment. The debate sparked by
religious campaigns to confront the political system with these issues is
uncomfortable , but the debate at least revives substantive political
issues and principles and pushes fundamental questions of justice and
peace to the forefront of attention in a system characterized by self-
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satisfied, cynical boredom with any issues but self-interest.7 Similarly,
instead of deploring the debate over the judicial principles and substantive views of Robert Bork, President Reagan's Supreme Court
nominee, we should welcome such debate as the true substance of
public, political life.
Neither politics nor political theory is to judge the truth of competing religious claims. I recognize that religious groups disagree on
matters of principle and policy and that they themselves pull in multiple directions. However, even their advocacy of conflicting principle is
vital, for genuine public life depends on matters of character and virtue
and pertains to substantive issues over which citizens interact and confront each other to create a common good out of conflicting interests
and principles. Politics must not deplore or dismiss religious competition, but rather moderate its worst passions.
The approach to justice in the 1986 pastoral letter on the economy
issued by the United State Catholic Conference illustrates my point. I
do not intend to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of that statement or the debate it occasioned or even to reveal my agreement or
disagreement with its positions. The point I wish to emphasize is
Gerald M. Mara's contention that the letter contains an account of
justice superior to such liberal, political treatments as Rawls's, for the
letter addresses the urgency of justice. 8 Political theorists' accounts of
justice tend to be abstract and categorical. They supply no urgent
motivation to act against injustice . The bishops' statement is substantive and sensitive to historical conditions. Moreover, it furnishes for
those who agree with it urgent motivation to political action.
The bishops' theory of justice is not philosophically unchallengable.
Yet their account of justice, like that of the Hebrew prophets,
resonates with the passion for justice. A religious dimension advances
in policy debate the passion for justice neglected by "neutral" theories
and interest-group politics. Justice touches the feeling heart as well as
the calculating head, and religion can push the public to take that fundamental emotion into account.
Similarly, the radical activity of those religious groups and individuals acting outside ordinary politics-such as Gandhi, Mother
Teresa, Dorothy Day, Mitch Snyder, and Dietrich Bonhoeffer-can
goad formal, bureaucratic political institutions to take account of a
higher spirit and a good greater than rules, efficiency, and the letter of
the law.9 Sparks often fly in such encounters, just as they fly in the
creative tension of a steel blade pressed against a sharpening stone.
Let me advance an even more controversial example of the kind of
contribution religion can make to politics in a liberal democratic society, one itself in some tension with the preceding paragraph . Though
religious groups may take obedience too far, liberal society needs
religion's lessons in obedience. For liberalism tries to abolish obedience by making the legitimacy of rules depend upon the satisfaction
of interests. Rousseau, no liberal but here in the liberal spirit, wanted
to find a way to make it possible in civil society to obey only oneself.
Liberalism tends to undermine the public grounds of obedience,
leaving it only, for example, for the private life of the family. Even in
private life, however, increasing public requirements for procedural
17

rights hedge obedience. Yet, as Milgram's experiments show, a deep
human propensity to obey authority remains even in liberal society. 10
"Blind" obedience, frowned upon by liberal principles, goes
underground and emerges in strange places, not least of which being
cultic forms of religion, such as that of the Reverend Jim Jones, and
claims of obedience to demons in cases of strange, often violent
behavior. Though I realize that these brief illustrations do not constitute proof, traditional Western religions could perform a public service in reemphasizing discipline and obedience with respect to
religious principles, rules, rituals, and behavior. Bringing obedience
above ground makes it more likely to find appropriate outlets.
If it enters policy debates on politics' terms, religion gives up its
claim to uniqueness, becoming one more interest group trapped within
the limited alternatives offered by modern ideologies. To accept these
alternatives would be to resolve the tension between religion and
politics by surrender. It would abandon the cold, lonely marches on
religion's border with politics for the warmth of the political capitol. I
contend, on the other hand, that religion must maintain its claim to a
truth higher than politics. This perspective does not mean that politics
can or should judge that truth, only that religious claims should force
politics to a higher level than it otherwise would discover. Its truth
claims do not relegate religion to the private sphere. The proper
ground of these claims is the public/private border, not the heartland
of private or of public life.
This argument suggests that religious persons should approach
politics from their particular faith perspectives, from their own truthclaims. Politics will water-down those claims sufficiently without
religious groups themselves attempting to find a lowest common
denominator set of religious or moral beliefs. Religious groups become
properly political and place the necessary pressure on politics when
they advocate their distinctive principles on matters of public concern
(this latter phrase is vital) and when they live faithfully their distinctive
beliefs about the transpolitical. 11
Religions should not promote all of their beliefs in political debate.
Doing so confuses the territory of religion with that of politics. Rather,
those religious beliefs and principles that most touch public concerns,
for example, justice, freedom, respect for life, peace, the place of sin,
death, and the meaning of human sociability, should enter political
debate in order to draw politics beyond the level where it otherwise
would settle. Privatization of religion is dangerous, because it allows
politics itself to become privatized and self-absorbed. As George Armstrong Kelly observes, "If privatization has pushed religion out of the
public sphere, it is currently turning politics into an I-Thou relationship
or a sphere of indifference." 12 Reduced to administration and interests,
politics becomes as secularized and squeezed of meaning as private
religion. Politics without high principles is a dull but dangerous
business for anyone not driven by consuming ambition, greed, or need
for recognition.

3. What Politics Teaches Religion
But religion without politics is also dangerous. I have alluded
18

previously to religious fanaticism. Messianism without a messiah
sweeps all principle before it. Religious persons often divide the world
into two camps, fellow believers and those outside the faith. Toward
the former the appropriate attitude is familiarity and community, including both affectionate feelings and (at times) discipline. Attitudes
toward the latter, however, include attempted conversion, conquest
and enslavement, and withdrawal. Relationships with outsiders
governed solely by their lack of faith allow no public bond between
believers and non-believers. What remains are only the deadly,
dichotomous categorizations: us and them, believers and heathens,
friends and enemies.
Public life creates other possibilities. The first is "stranger. " 13 The
fellow believer is known as one of the group, and the heathen is known
through stereotypes. The stranger, however, is mysterious and
unknown. He may be one of us or one of them, a potential friend or
enemy . Or, the most radical possibility of all, he may just be himself,
different from us, but related none the less. Public life, especially in the
form of politics, requires interaction with strangers. For politics is full
of strangers, people with ideas, customs, interests, emotions, and
beliefs different from, and sometimes at odds with, our own. Entry into
a political relationship with strangers dispels some mystery, but does
not eliminate it. Strangers still remain different. Nevertheless, politics
opens a middle camp between friends and enemies, and, because both
friends and enemies trade with that camp, the world seems less black
and white, the grounds of fanaticism less solid.
Indeed, politics requires everyone to spend some time among
strangers and to discover their own strangeness. Politics is selfdiscovery as well as self-display. Believers who enter politics enter the
strangers' camp and discover things about strangers and about
themselves that alter their frame of reference and call for less singlemindedness, for more tolerance and civility. Ultimately, believers
might even learn that they are strangers to themselves and that God is
also a stranger, for the God completely known does not transcend
human control. Politics can teach religion humility and the tolerance
that is humility's natural partner. It may teach the believer the limits of
his belief. 14
Politics can teach religion how to live with pluralism. As religion
can reconcile politics to mysterious forces beyond its control, so
politics can reconcile religion to facticity, to the hard places against
which the tide of religion crashes . Religious ideals meet recalcitrant
political reality and the strangers who live there. The principles,
values, excellences, and virtues of religious life cannot suffuse public
or private life with the wave of a wand or a word of blessing. Use of
coercion is always a temptation for frustrated virtue, a temptation to
which even the most perceptive (witness Augustine) can succumb. In
authoritarian, totalitarian, or oligarchic regimes, use of coercion finds
ready justification. A political regime, however, supports resistance to
imposed religious ideals, blunts the weapon of coercion, and teaches
religion other methods for dissemination of belief. As William Penn
suggested in the headnote, coercion is the coarsest part of government;
so political regimes restrict its availability.
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When politics involves the encounter of strangers on a common
ground where they must interact peaceably, it learns compromise.
Compromise is a lesson religion too must learn, though it does not like
the name and tries to find synonyms, like "prudence" or "pastoral
solutions." The full excellence of religious ideals is seldom achieved.
As J. Budziszewski argues, " ... Real excellence is apt to be a rare
item, more like leaven than like flour. Cultivating the excellences will
always be of the first importance, but we should also be prepared to
curb and channel the flows and eruptions of passion. " 15 Compromise is
one way, a distinctively political way, of resolving the tensions between religious ideals and recalcitrant facts .
This role for politics allows religion to be religion; it allows all
religions to advance their views strongly. Religion entering politics
should not be wishy-washy. But politics and the necessity of compromise force religious groups to recognize the plurality of the political
world, especially the plurality of religious groups strongly advancing
distinctive views. The point is not for religious groups to compromise
their principles in order to enter the fray, but for politics to force compromise at the level of policy. 16 When religious groups recognize and
acknowledge both politics as a form of public life and the recalcitrant
facticity of political life, they can begin, not to change their principles,
but to find ways of applying them to policy that are acceptable to other
citizens . They can begin to learn political civility, tolerance, and the art
of compromise. Observe the course of the Reverend Jerry Falwell in
moderating his policy proposals on abortion and other agenda items of
the New Religious Right from the late 1970s to the late 1980s.
In the previous section I used the Catholic bishops' pastoral letter
on the economy to illustrate the contribution religion can make to
politics in introducing high conceptions of justice into political debate.
Let me use the same example to illustrate what political life can teach
religion. The bishops' letter is particularly vulnerable to criticism in
light of the social and economic realities of modern, post-industrial
society. The pastoral letter does not address these realities creatively,
nor does it reflect the limitations of social and economic resources for
realizing the principles of justice.17 The passionate concern for justice
that is the bishops' special contribution must meet the social realities
that are politics' special concern. Both are necessary for creative
policy-making.
There are two fundamental dangers of public religion: religious
domination of public life and the affiliation of religion with political
ideology. Both dangers stem from religious passion. The first occurs
when religion is able to use government as a means for realizing its vision. The second occurs when religious passion is coopted (often willingly) by a political ideology and used for the ideology's ends.
The realities of participatory politics moderate the proclivity of
government and political ideology to inflame or coopt, and sometimes
to be coopted by, religious passion. First, politics tames religious passion for reasons suggested above. Passion must put on decorous
clothes to appear in public. Moreover, religious passion encounters the
seawall of interest-group reality and of counter passions in other
religious and non-religious groups. The garb of moderation and the
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confrontation with other interests and passions means that religious
passions must actually become moderate or, more precisely, seek more
moderate, tame expression and more limited goals. The realities of
pluralism make it less likely that government or ideologies will be able
to enflame religious fervor or to be coopted by such emotions more
than temporarily. 18 There are too many influences on the state for
religion to dominate more than briefly.
This is as it should be. Religion should expect to be only one voice
(though actually itself many) in political life. It can help to move policy
in certain directions, but it cannot expect to determine the outcome of
political debate.
One unfortunate, but unavoidable, consequence of the political
taming of religion is that both good and bad religious passions are
tempered. Politics is, in this sense, indiscriminate. Given politics'
haphazard effect, what counts is the character of citizens. Ultimately,
the people must separate the wheat from the chaff of religious ideals
and passions.
There is no guarantee of popular virtue, but preservation of the
good and discarding the bad finally depends upon it. The mechanisms
of public life cannot make such judgments, but only furnish the space,
time, and civility needed for character to work. The many political
devices for channeling passion known to the ancients and moderns are
prone to fail, to lose sight of excellence. 19 Compromise itself cannot be
a final ideal, for compromises must be judged better and worse. We
come full circle from what politics teaches religion to what religion
teaches politics. Religious vision can help to judge and call to account
political compromise, keeping the aspiration toward excellence before
citizen attention.

4. Conclusions
It seems to follow that, if religion is public in the ways I have
specified and if it makes the political contributions I have described,
then it should be admitted to political life on precisely the same terms
as other groups. Yet an important consideration militates against this
simple conclusion. Religion is fundamentally private as well as public.
Religion is a distinct realm from politics. Inviting it too far into political
territory runs the many risks of politicized religion and chances dilution of its distinctive qualities.
Religion should not be excluded from politics, but kept at arm's
length. The relationship between religion and politics should imitate
that of partners in a dance of approach and flight, a ballet expressing
the tension between attraction and repulsion. Neither partner must
dominate, if the dance is to continue. Religion and politics challenge
and test each other; that is their special dynamic.
Let me return to the metaphor of the border. What is vital is that
religion and politics meet, not in the center of each other's territory,
but at the border. This leaves sufficient mystery for mutual attraction.
Religion beckons from the periphery for politics to come seek its
ideals; politics cajoles religion to shed its unrealistic ideals and
recognize the goods of plurality, civility, and tolerance. Such transac-
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tions across the border also produce just enough knowledge for mutual
repulsion . Religion knows well the temptations of power. 20 Politics
recognizes the fanaticism of religion and flees it.
Religion exists on a double border: the boundary between private
and public life and the boundary with politics. Life on the border is
never easy, but religion should remain there. To confront politics
wholeheartedly, though not to enter it fully, constitutes its political
mission. To abandon either private or public life is to betray its
essence.
The lines of influence between religion and politics do not run one
way. Politics, and culture generally, shapes religion as much as religion
shapes politics. Not every political influence on religion is beneficial.
Evidently , religion can learn the worst aspects of politics as well as the
best. The point is that the debate about religion and politics, and the
speculations of political theorists, have neglected the positive influences in each direction, the creative tensions characterizing this encounter.
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